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Abstract
We analyze credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have
a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set
interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker’s (1990)
analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero
screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of
marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks
make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an
increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market
efficiency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the
case where banks have differing screening abilities.
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Interbank Competition with Costly Screening
1. Introduction
This paper explores the nature of equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information
when banks are able to screen their customers. Information asymmetries are central to credit
markets. There is nowadays a basic agreement among academics that banks exist because they
monitor rms (Diamond, 1984; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Holmström and Tirole, 1993). Hence,
models of the credit market should incorporate a screening-monitoring role for banks. It is
widely appreciated that introducing asymmetric information into models of the credit market
yields equilibria with specic features. Contributions like those of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) exhibit equilibrium phenomena such as credit rationing and ex
post monopoly of information, which are absent from standard delivery-versus-payment markets.
Still, credit market models seem seldom to acknowledge the importance of screening. This
creates an apparent schism between models of bank/rm contracts, where screening is cen-
tral, and models of the credit market, where screening is typically non-existent. Fortunately,
Broeckers (1990) model provides a bridge between the two by exploring credit market equilib-
rium when banks screen rms. However, in Broeckers equilibrium banks use mixed strategies
to assign interest rates for loans. This is an unattractive feature for various reasons. First, it
yields no empirical implications; second, it makes it di¢ cult to study the comparative statics
or the welfare properties of the model; third, ex-post banks will have incentives to change their
realized interest rates so that a mixed strategy equilibrium does not represent a stable situation.
Hence, although Broeckers elegant contribution is a step in the right direction, we think that
it is worth devoting some e¤ort to extending it.
The intuition behind Broeckers contribution is straightforward. When banks screen loan
applicants, the order in which rms approach banks is important. Rational rms will apply
rstly to the banks which post the lowest interest rates. As a result, a bank may ensure by
lowering its interest rate that it has rst choice from the population of loan applicants. So the
bank simultaneously alters the price at which it lends, and the marginal cost of lending. Hence
a bank may be able to prot by undercutting its competitors. Setting price equal to marginal
cost in the traditional way may therefore not yield an equilibrium. This is at odds with standard
microeconomic theory and hence opens new avenues for exploration. This is precisely the object
of our paper.
Our work is primarily motivated by the divide between the theoretical justication for banks
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and current models of the credit market. In spanning the divide, we wish to address two specic
points.
Firstly, mixed strategy equilibria are rather unsatisfying in the context of price competition.
Once interest rates realize, banks would always want to change them immediately. For example,
the bank with the lowest interest rate would always prefer to increase it. Moreover, the empirical
evidence does not support the conclusion that bank loan rates move erratically and, across
banks, independently all of the time. Finally, it is hard to derive empirical predictions from
mixed strategy equilibria.
Secondly, we wish to understand whether the credit market should be thought of as a
natural monopoly. If so, credit market equilibria should be characterized by equilibrium
prots. This question is related to the relationship between competition and nancial stability,
which has been investigated in models where banks have the choice of their riskiness levels (as
for example in Matutes and Vives, 2000), but never in a set-up where the level of screening and
of credit risk in the banking industry is endogenous because it depends on the number of banks
an applicant is able to visit.
Clearly, the answers to these points will inform regulatory attitudes towards credit market
entry, and hence will have important policy implications. We address these issues in a model
of a credit market in which banks face an adverse selection problem due to heterogeneity in
rm repayment probabilities. We assume that banks have to rely upon active monitoring when
responding to a rms application for a loan. The monitoring technology is imperfect and
independent across banks. Banks must account for the fact that their loan applicants may have
already been rejected by other banks. In particular, a single bank o¤ering the lowest interest
rates will on average attract better applicants than banks charging higher interest rates.
We extend Broeckers framework by assuming that banks incur a screening cost which is
increasing and convex in the number of applicants which they screen. A simple example would
be a capacity constraint which renders it very costly (or just simply impossible) to screen
all applicants. Our main result is that pure strategy equilibria exist for su¢ ciently convex
screening costs. With convex screening costs, undercutting ones competitors in order to gain
market share and an improved applicant pool may be discouraged by the consequential increase
in screening costs. The equilibrium is characterized by indeterminacy, as banks can coordinate
on a number of di¤erent interest rates. This is an interesting feature of our model, as it implies
that equilibrium is largely independent of marginal costs, a point which is largely supported by
empirical research as we show in the next section.
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It is also worth emphasizing the existence in our model of positive prots for banks in
equilibrium. This contrasts with Broeckers result that, with su¢ ciently many banks, the mixed
strategy equilibrium yields zero prots for all banks. Our model has a number of free entry
equilibria, characterized by di¤ering numbers of active banks. The more banks that decide
to be active in equilibrium, the lower the average quality of borrowers and the higher the
equilibrium interest rate charged by all of them. A bad project therefore has a higher chance of
securing a loan when there are more banks. Hence it seems reasonable to expect that welfare
will be decreasing in the number of active banks. We demonstrate for a specic screening cost
function that this is indeed the case, and we provide a detailed numberical example with a
di¤erent cost function in which increasing the number of banks lowers welfare. Hence, our
paper provides additional support for the common statement that regulators should restrict
entry to the banking sector.
Finally, we introduce some element of natural oligopoly to our model by examining the
case where banks di¤er in their screening ability. We show that an inferior bank su¤ers losses
whenever a superior bank charges the same or a lower interest rate. When interest rates are the
same, the reason is that high quality borrowers will in the rst instance approach the lender
with the superior screening technology while low quality borrowers will approach the other bank.
Hence the bank with a comparatively weaker screening technology will also face an inferior pool
of borrowers. When interest rates di¤er the bank with the weaker screening technology will
face a weaker pool of borrowers because all have already been rejected by the bank with the
stronger technology. We characterize the equilibria in section 7.
Our work is related to a number of papers. Firstly, as discussed at length above, Broecker
(1990) models price competition amongst banks with a zero screening cost, and shows that the
only equilibria are in mixed strategies. His results have been widely discussed in the lending
literature (von Thadden, 2004) and extended by DellAriccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999)
to analyze entry in the banking industry and by Marquez (2002) to explore the e¤ect of in-
creased competition on the quality of credit. Pure strategy equilibria obtain in our model for
a su¢ ciently convex screening cost function. This result is slightly related to Riordan (1993),
who proves the existence of pure strategy equilibrium when banks receive signals from a con-
tinuous distribution and interest rates are charged conditional on the signal (which allows price
discrimination).
Secondly, our results bear a direct relationship to the substantial literature which has argued
that welfare is enhanced by allowing banks to obtain non-competitive rents, since this provides
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them with the right incentives. This could be a result of horizontal di¤erentiation (Chiappori
et al., 1995, and Matutes and Vives, 2000), because banks then choose to reduce the risk of
the assets (Suarez, 1998, Matutes and Vives, 2000), or because they extract ex post rents from
their lending relationships (Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1992, von Thadden, 1994). The possibility
that competition may be ine¢ cient is also acknowledged by Petersen and Rajan (1995), as in
their model a more competitive banking market is not necessarily a more e¢ cient one because
competition makes it harder for young rms to build banking relationships and hence to obtain
a loan.
Finally, our paper is related to Dastidar (1995), who shows that in a setting of oligopolistic
price competition with homogeneous goods and convex costs, pure strategy equilibria exist
when rms are obliged to serve all demand. As in our model, rms do not have incentives to
undercut to increase market share since this would increase their average production cost and
lower overall prots. In our model, banks can increase market share and improve the average
quality of applicants by undercutting competing banks, but again, the convexity of (screening)
costs renders such strategies unsuccessful.
We present our analysis as follows. The next section provides stylized facts and empirical
evidence which are consistent with our model. Section 3 describes a model of a credit market
in which loan applications and loan screening are costly. Section 4 demonstrates the existence
in our model of pure strategy equilibria for an exogenously given number of banks; comparative
statics are derived in section 5, and section 6 provides a numerical example of the equilibrium.
In section 7 we analyze an extension with heterogeneous bank monitoring skills. Section 8
concludes.
2. Stylized Facts and Empirical Evidence
In this section we present evidence from the existing literature which is supportive of our work.
2.1. Screening Costs
Banks use lters to screen consumers according to their credit worthiness: this provides evidence
of costly screening. An important example of costly screening is the use for a fee of common
databases in assessing applications for credit. Credit analysis of consumer loans (including credit
cards) typically involves a background credit check of widely accessible databases maintained
by one of the three large consumer credit bureaus (in the US they are Equifax, Experian/TRW
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and Trans Union). Standardized credit scoring models are now commercially available for credit
cards, mortgage lending, and small business. To the extent that the updating and collecting
of new information is costly, the use of these databases for screening purposes is not free (as a
reference point, Equifax charges between 50-100 US dollars per single inquiry).
2.2. Sticky Interest Rates
Ausubel (1991) nds evidence that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky
relative to the cost of funds. Ausubel studies the US market for credit cards, and nds that
bankscost of funds (the marginal cost of producing loans) has fallen rapidly from its level in the
late 1970s. Although this fall has been accompanied by a drop in rates on collateralized loans,
credit card rates have remained relatively high. In particular, Ausubel presents evidence that
credit card rates have been particularly sticky in the 1980s. In a regression of credit card rates
on the cost of funds over the 1982-1987 period, he nds that the cost of funds was statistically
signicant, but the magnitude of the coe¢ cient (about 0.05, depending on the specication)
suggested that the cost of funds was economically insignicant in explaining credit card rates.
It is important to observe that a competitive market model would predict a coe¢ cient near to
one. The evidence then shows that it takes many years for the price to adjust to changes in
marginal cost when the rate of adjustment is only on the order of 5% per quarter.
This stickiness is surprising since the cost of funds is the primary determinant of the marginal
cost of lending via credit cards, and it is usually the only component of marginal costs that
varies widely from quarter to quarter. A model of continuous spot market equilibrium would
predict a substantial degree of connection between the interest rate charged on credit cards and
the banks cost of funds. However, the evidence available shows that credit card interest rates
were highly sticky during the decade of the 1980s.
Using roughly the same data employed by Ausubel in his study, we constructed the following
graph which shows that the relative stickiness of credit card interest rates with respect to the
cost of funds for the period 1980-2003.
Ausubel also reports that the credit card industry defended its high interest rates in the mid-
to-late 1980s, in part, by asserting that the increased spread between the credit card interest
rate and the cost of funds had been caused by an increase in the industrys rate of bad loans.
Higher loan losses are an explanation for the higher interest spreads only if one believes that
the latter are solely determined by costs. If credit card interest rates are determined otherwise,
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Figure 1: Source: Credit Card Interest Rates from The Protability of Credit Card Opera-
tions of Depositary Institutions, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual
Report, June 2004. Cost of Funds is the one-year US Treasury bill yield plus 0.75 percent as
dened by Ausubel (1991).
then the causation may run in the reverse direction: an increased interest spread may cause an
increase in charge-o¤s.
Calem and Mester (1995), drawing data from the Federal Reserves 1989 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, also provide empirical evidence in support of the low responsiveness of credit
card interest rates to changes in banks costs of funds. In particular, these authors support
the argument that this degree of stickiness can be explained by: (a) cardholderssearch and
switching costs, and (b) the fact that banks would face an adverse selection problem if they were
to reduce their interest rate unilaterally. On the other hand, Hannan and Berger (1991) stud-
ied banksdecisions to change local deposit rates in response to exogenous changes in interest
rates. Using monthly observations of deposit rates o¤ered by 398 banks located in 132 US local
banking markets covering the period from September 1983 to December 1986, they found that
price rigidity is signicantly greater in markets characterized by higher levels of concentration
and that deposit rates are signicantly more rigid when the stimulus for a change is upward
rather than downward.
The observation that interest rates are independent of marginal costs is further supported
in Hannan and Berger (1991) and Mester (1994).
6
Submission to The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
http://www.bepress.com/bejte
Clearly, there are other explanations for the stickiness of interest rates. The model presented
in this paper can be seen as an additional explanation of this important economic phenomenon,
but is not intended to explain it entirely.
2.3. Interest Rates and Market Structure
Sha¤er (1998) reports that virtually all structural models or other new empirical industrial
organisationstudies of banking nd essentially competitive loan pricing not only nationwide,
but also in highly concentrated markets such as Canada (where the industry is dominated by
fewer than half a dozen large banks), rural counties in a unit banking state, or even a banking
duopoly. This is an important nding since if conduct is competitive and if costs do not vary
systematically with market structure, then the interest rate on loans will not be a function of
the number of banks. Interestingly, Sha¤er notes that anecdotal evidence from bankers suggests
that they do respond to the practices, but not consciously to the number, of rival lenders.
On the other hand, Sha¤er, using a cross-sectional sample of nearly 3,000 banks in over 300
single geographic markets across the US as of year-end 1990, found that loan chargeo¤ rates are
a signicantly increasing function of the total number of banks in the geographic market. The
estimated magnitude of the e¤ect implies that each additional rival bank drives up the gross
chargeo¤ rate of each incumbent by 0.10 basis points.
In our model, proposition 1 shows that increased bank competition may be ine¢ cient:
namely, that more projects will be funded in equilibrium when there are more banks. As a
result, credit risk will increase and so too will interest rates. Empirical support for these nd-
ings is provided by Sha¤er (1998), who nds that Among mature banks, those operating in
less concentrated banking markets experience signicantly higher chargeo¤ rates for commercial
loans and for total loans (p.389). Thus, the policy implication of our results is that it might
be e¢ cient to restrict entry into the credit market, as this reduces the number of chances for
poor borrower to obtain funds.
Emons(2001) work on house insurance is also related to our paper. He presents a model in
which house owners can apply for insurance from multiple providers without investing in safety
measures. As a result, both prices and the number of damage claims are higher in competitive
markets than in a monopolistic setting. In Switzerland and Germany some regions have a
monopolistic insurance market, while others are competitive. Emons provides evidence from
these markets which is consistent with our theory.
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3. The Model
Our model is a modied version of Broecker (1990). We consider a credit market with a
continuum [0; 1] of risk-neutral rms, each of which wishes to borrow $1 to invest in a project
which will return $X if it succeeds and $0 if it fails. The success probability of type a rms is
pa and of type b rms is pb, where 0  pa < pb  1. A rms type is its private information.
The proportion l 2 (0; 1) of type a rms is common knowledge.
There are N  2 risk neutral banks in the market which can raise any amount of funds at
a unit interest rate. If a bank lends at a gross interest rate r to  type a rms and to  type
b rms then its prot will be  (pamin (X; r)  1) +  (pbmin (X; r)  1). Banks have access to
an imperfect monitoring technology. The technology assigns each loan applicant to a category
C 2 fA;Bg. We dene
q (Cjc) = P fApplicant is assigned to C 2 fA;Bg jApplicants type is c 2 fa; bgg .
We write qc for q (Ajc) so that:
q (Aja) = qa, q (Bja) = 1  qa,
q (Ajb) = qb, q (Bjb) = 1  qb.
We do not require, and we do not make, the simplifying assumption qa = 1  qb characteristic
of a completely symmetric test.
We adopt Broeckers assumption that screening is informative but imperfect:
0 < qb < qa < 1. (A1)
It is an easy matter to show as Broecker does that this implies that
pA < p < pB,
where pA and pB are respectively the average success probability of category A and B rms,
when there is only one bank where rms can apply, and p = lpa+(1  l)pb is the average success
probability of all rms. The fact that screening is imperfect causes an adverse selection e¤ect
when there are at least two banks. For example, assume two banks charge the same interest
rate and, in rst instance, each bank attracts half of the rms. The average success probability
of those rms is of course p. However, rms that are rejected by their rst bank will apply to
the other bank. The average success probability of rms who have failed one test is strictly
lower than p, since tests are informative. The overall success probability of applicants at any of
the banks is therefore also strictly below p.
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We adopt the following additional assumption from Broeckers paper, which implies that at
least one bank will not make losses if it charges r = X to category B rms:
pBX   1 > 0. (A2)
Broecker also assumes that pAX 1 < 0, so that banks do not wish to lend to category A rms.
We will make the slightly stronger assumption that banks do not want to lend to rms that are
not screened at all. Our assumption thus emphasizes the role of banks in credit markets:1
pX   1 < 0. (A3)
Broecker assumes that applying for a loan is costless, and that banks incur no screening
costs. We depart from his model by incorporating application and screening costs:
There is a cost " > 0 of applying for a loan; (A40)
The cost of screening x applicants is C (x) ,
where C(0) = C 0(0) = 0; C 00  0 and C(1) < pBX   1 (A50)
We introduce the " cost of loan application so as to ensure that rms will prefer to apply
sequentially for loans: only after its application for a loan is rejected, it applies at another bank.
This avoids duplication of screening costs compared to the situation where all rms would apply
simultaneously to all banks. The upper bound on the maximal screening cost is su¢ ciently low
to ensure that a single bank will prot from making loans to rms which pass the screening
test.
Convexity of the screening cost C () is a crucial assumption of this model, which di¤er-
entiates it from Broeckers. We believe that it is a realistic depiction of reality: most banks
rely upon a department of credit specialists to screen loan applications. As in other models of
labour, it is reasonable to assume that their costs are convex in the quantity of loan applications
that they process. In addition, the paper focusses on the realistic scenario where banks cannot
costlessly discard a potentially large number of loan applicants. This assumption is again crucial
to our analysis.
The loan application process works as follows. Assumptions (A3) and (A1) together imply
that banks will not lend to category A rms and so in the rst stage banks simultaneously
1 If banks were happy to lend without screening then a single bank would be willing to undercut its competitors
and to screen if the benets it derived from doing so outweighed the costs of screening. Hence, with an appropriate
parameterization, our results would still go through. However, by adopting a stronger assumption than Broeckers
we are able to rule out equilibria of the type where one group of banks charges a higher interest rate than another
group of banks. Our additional assumption does not play a role in showing existence of pure strategy equilibria.
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announce whether they wish to provide credit and, if they do so, the rate r 2 [0; X] at which
they will lend to type B rms. Firms then make sequential applications for loans.2 We assume
that a bank cannot distinguish or discriminate between a rm that directly applies to this bank
and a rm that has applied (and was rejected) elsewhere.
Broecker shows (Proposition 2.1) that under assumptions (A1)  (A3) and with no costs
of loan application or of screening, this one-stage game has no equilibrium in pure strategies.
In the following section we demonstrate that for appropriate functions C (), the additional
assumption (A40) guaranteeing sequential loan applications is su¢ cient to overturn this result.
An important step in the proof consists of determining the number of applicants each bank has
to screen and the average repay probability of approved loans. In particular, we need this in the
case of L banks setting the same interest rate and all other active banks setting strictly higher
interest rates.
Lemma 1. Suppose that L banks o¤er the lowest interest rate. Let f (L) be the number of rms
screened by any of these banks, and let hk(L) be the number of clients of type k (k = a; b) which
each of these banks has. Then
f (L) =
1
L

l

1  qLa
1  qa

+ (1  l)

1  qLb
1  qb

.
ha(L) =
l(1  qLa )
L
hb(L) =
(1  l)(1  qLb )
L
Proof: In the appendix. 2
4. Existence of a Pure Strategy Equilibria
In this section we demonstrate the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for the game which
we dened in section 3. We start by making the following denition:
Definition 1. In pure strategy combinations where r is the lowest rate and it is charged by x
banks:
1. U (r; x) is the expected prot earned by each of the x banks;
2. r0 (x) is the lowest value for r at which the x banks make non negative prots.
The number of banks N is exogenously given: if N is large enough, it will not be possible for
every bank to earn positive prots if they all o¤er loans.3 We therefore assume that banks can
2 In Broeckers original paper rms make simultaneous loan applications: our modication of his game is
rendered necessary by assumption (A40).
3This is even true if we ignore the screening costs: see Broecker (1990).
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elect to be inactive in equilibrium, and that this earns them zero prots.4 With this assumption,
a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which L active banks each charge an interest
rate r will be characterized by the following conditions:
(PS1) Banks must be prepared to lend at r, and rms must be prepared to borrow:
X  r  r0(L).
This implies in particular that U(r; L)  0, so that no active bank prefers to be inactive.
(PS2) No active bank should wish to lower its interest rate slightly:
U(r; L)  U(r; 1)
Once (PS1) is satised, a su¢ cient condition for (PS2) to hold is that 0  U(r; 1), which
can be restated as r  r0(1).
(PS3) No active bank should benet from an upward deviation, even to the highest possible
interest rate X.
Finally, if L < N , so that there are inactive banks, three additional conditions have to be
imposed:
(PS4) None of the N   L inactive banks should elect to become active at a lower interest rate;
(PS5) None of the N  L inactive banks should elect to become active at the same interest rate;
(PS6) None of the N   L inactive banks should elect to become active at a higher interest rate.
To demonstrate that conditions PS1-6 can be satised simultaneously, we require an as-
sumption regarding the quality of rms which receive opposing results from screenings by two
di¤erent banks. Inequality (ES) below states that banks are unwilling to lend to such rms,5 so
that a bank will discard a positive result from its own screening if it knows that a competitor
has already received a negative result for the same rm.
lqa(1  qa)pa + (1  l)qb(1  qb)pb
lqa(1  qa) + (1  l)qb(1  qb) X < 1: (ES)
With a symmetric screening technology such that 1 > qa = 1   qb > 1=2, obtaining two
opposite results is equivalent to having no test result at all. In this case, the left hand side of
4Alternatively, we could weaken the equilibrium concept and modify (PS1) so as to allow banks to bear losses,
which is in line with the idea that the number of banks is xed in the short run and variable through entry/exit
in the long run. The proof of existence is then simplied.
5This assumption was made by Broecker (1990) in the second part of his paper to show existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium when banks can withdraw from the market after observing all interest rates o¤ered.
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the inequality reduces to pX and the assumption (ES) is equivalent to assumption (A3). In
general, inequality (ES) is satised when banks are relatively better at identifying type b than
type a rms. It certainly holds in the limiting case where 1 > qa > qb = 0 and type b rms
are perfectly identied since in this case (ES) reduces to paX < 1. On the other hand, it is not
satised when 1 = qa > qb > 0 so that the screening technology perfectly identies type a rms,
since (ES) then reduces to pbX < 1. Note that (ES) holds independently of L, a point that will
greatly simplify the analysis.
Under (ES), no bank has an incentive to charge a higher interest rate than its competitors:
Lemma 2. When (PS1) is satised, condition (ES) implies condition (PS3).
Proof: In the appendix. 2
The intuition for lemma 2 is as follows. Deviating to a higher interest rate will attract only
those borrowers who have already been rejected by banks charging the lower interest rate. Under
(ES) the deviating bank will discard its own signal in this case and assumption (A3), which
states that unscreened projects have negative present value, then ensures that the applicant will
be rejected.
We now examine su¢ cient conditions for condition (PS2) to be satised. It transpires that
it is su¢ cient to assume that the minimum break-even interest rate r0 is greater with one than
with two banks. When there are two banks each will screen fewer rms. When C (x)  0 as
in Broeckers paper this is not important and we demonstrate in the appendix that r0 (L) is
increasing in L. However, if C () is su¢ ciently convex then this result is reversed at L = 1:
Lemma 3. r0 (1) > r0 (2) if and only if the following convexity condition (C) is satised:
lpa(1  qa)[(1 + qa)C(1)  2C(f(2))]
lpa(1  qa) + (1  l)pb(1  qb) +
(1  l)pb(1  qb)[(1 + qb)C(1)  2C(f(2))]
lpa(1  qa) + (1  l)pb(1  qb)
> l (1  qa) (1  qb) (qa   qb) (1  l) (pb   pa) =(lpa(1  qa) + (1  l)pb(1  qb)): (C)
Proof: In the appendix. 2
Note that the right-hand side of (C) is strictly positive and independent of C(). The left-
hand side of the inequality is a weighted average of (1+ qa)C(1)  2C(f(2)) and (1+ qb)C(1) 
2C(f(2)). If the weights used were l and (1   l) respectively, this average would be exactly
equal to zero in case of linear cost function C() (since 2f(2) = l(1 + qa) + (1  l)(1 + qb)), but
in the case of a strictly convex cost function the average is strictly positive.
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In the limit case of perfect screening, with qa = 1 and qb = 0, condition (C) boils down
to C(1) > 2C(f(2)). Since f(2) = 1+l2 , this reduces to C(1) > 2C(
1+l
2 ), stating again that
linear costs would not satisfy the condition, and that a degree of convexity is required which is
increasing in l.
Conditions (ES) and (C) are su¢ cient to guarantee the existence of a pure strategy equilib-
rium:
Theorem 1. Assume that (ES) holds. When screening costs are su¢ ciently convex (in partic-
ular, when (C) holds) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in which more than one bank is
active and where all active banks charge the same interest rate r. Moreover, in any pure strategy
Nash equilibrium all active banks charge the same interest rate.
The formal proof of this result appears in the appendix. The convexity condition (C) is
essential because, by lemma 3, it guarantees that r0 (L) cannot be minimized at L = 1. Hence
either r0 (L) has an interior minimum turning point (not necessarily unique) L 2 N (1; N),
or r0 is minimized at N . In the former case (PS2) is satised for L = L and an asymmetric
equilibrium obtains in which some banks elect to remain inactive, while in the latter it is satised
at L = N and a symmetric equilibrium obtains in which every bank is active. Note that the
two types of equilibria are not mutually exclusive.
In both the asymmetric equilibrium case (L = L) and the symmetric equilibrium case
(L = N), an equilibrium exists for any interest rate in a range above r0 (L). As a result, active
banks make equilibrium prots. Since the equilibrium interest rate can lie within a range, it is
indeterminate. We do not see this as a negative result. The specic characteristics of the credit
market when screening is accounted for leads quite naturally to this result. Any coordination
device which allowed us fully to characterize the equilibrium (Central Bank announcement,
colluding to the highest possible interest rate, . . . ) would therefore be ad hoc.
One interesting implication of interest rate indeterminacy is that it partially disconnects
credit from the marginal cost of funds. Only in the case of large shocks will some adjustment be
necessary. As interest rates hit the lower bound r0, or the number of active banks has to adjust,
we may switch from one equilibrium to another one. In general, small changes in the models
parameters will produce small changes in the rates r0 so that the interest rate r will remain in
the same interval. Hence interest rates will not react immediately to changes in marginal costs,
and in particular to changes in interbank rates. This is of interest, as it is consistent with the
observation that interest rates for loans change only sporadically, as discussed in section 2.2
above, and which still lacks a fully satisfactory theoretical justication.
13
Freixas et al.: Interbank Competition
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
Finally, recall that the number of active banks is somewhat indeterminate. However, we
can establish that the number of active banks is bounded above, and hence that the symmetric
equilibrium (L = N) cannot occur for large enough N :
Lemma 4. There exists a maximum number of active banks, M .
5. Comparative Statics
We dene social welfare in this model to be the total present value of all nanced projects, less
the total screening costs:
W (L)  l  1  qLa  (paX   1) + (1  l)  1  qLb  (pbX   1)  LC (f (L)) . (1)
In this section we examine the e¤ect of L upon social welfare and upon bank protability
for the following specic cost function:
C (s) =
8><>: 0, s < 1c, otherwise (2)
We interpret C () as describing the costs of a capacity-constrained bank. Recall that C(s) is
the cost of screening s applicants. Hence, s can be interpreted as market share. A single bank
is just able to screen all applicants but at a high cost. We assume that c > 0 is such that a
single bank charging X will make small but positive prots and that condition (C) is satised
so that existence of pure strategy equilibria is guaranteed as before: undercutting is optimal
only when high interest rates are charged.
Proposition 1. When screening costs are given by equation (2), welfare in equilibrium is a
decreasing function of L.
Proof: In the appendix. 2
As we discuss in the introduction, the intuition behind proposition 1 is simple: a bad project
has more chance of securing a loan when there are more banks. Hence, provided an increase in
the number of banks does not reduce aggregate screening costs signicantly, it will lower welfare.
This remark suggests that proposition 1 can be generalized to more general cost functions. For
example, it remains true when the cost function C(s) is linear for s < 1. Also, for all convex
cost functions it will be the case that welfare is eventually decreasing in the number of active
banks, that is, for n > n, for some n. The intuition behind this is that the reduction in
total screening cost by having one extra bank becomes small when many banks are active. We
14
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provide an example in section 6 below with a continuous and convex cost function in which
welfare is decreasing in the number of active banks in equilibrium.
6. An Illustrative Example
We now demonstrate that the pure strategy equilibrium conditions (PS1) (PS6) are compatible
by considering numerical specications for the parameters of the model. We also consider welfare
and prots for this example.
Let qa = 0:75, qb = 0:6, pa = 0:3, pb = 0:7, l = 0:4, X = 1:84, and C (x) = 0:02x5. It is easy
to check that assumptions (A1)-(A3) are satised. It is also easily veried that the screening
costs are so low that a single bank charging X would make positive prot. (Broecker, 1990,
shows that this follows from (A2) in the case of no screening costs.) Straightforward calculations
yield
r0(1) = 1:818 > r0(2) = 1:789 > r0(3) = 1:785;
r0(4) = 1:792 < r0(5) = 1:801 < r0(6) = 1:810 < r0(1) < r0(n) for n  7;
r0(n) > X for all n > 11:
We assume that there are N  12 potential banks in the market. There are no pure strategy
equilibria with one or two active banks, since any inactive bank would make strictly positive
prots by mimicking an active bank. Furthermore, no pure equilibria exist where more than six
banks enter, since these banks can only break even by charging an interest rate strictly above
r0(1), in which case an inactive bank could make a positive prot by undercutting slightly below
r0(1). On the other hand, for L = 3, 4, and 5, it is an equilibrium for L active banks to charge
any interest rate r 2 [r0(L); r0(L + 1)]. It is also an equilibrium for six banks to charge any
interest rate r 2 [r0(6); r0(1)].
Observe that the more banks are active in equilibrium, the higher is the equilibrium interest
rate. The reason for this is twofold: on the one hand, a few banks charging a relatively high
interest rate would provoke entry by additional banks; on the other hand, when many banks
o¤er the same interest rate, average credit quality is quite low and hence the interest rate must
be quite high to ensure that the banks break even.
The interest rate simply determines a transfer between rms and banks and hence does not
a¤ect social welfare W (L). Total surplus depends only upon the number of active banks in
equilibrium. With more active banks, more and on average worse projects get nanced. This
e¤ect is welfare decreasing, but is partially o¤set by the convexity of the screening cost function.
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It can be easily calculated that the total welfare with 3, 4, 5, and 6 banks equals, W (3) = 0:032,
W (4) = 0:028, W (5) = 0:023, and W (6) = 0:017, respectively. Hence, welfare is highest with
the least number of banks.
We now consider bank prots. Obviously, these depend upon the equilibrium interest as
well as the number of active banks. Since for L 2 f3; 4; 5; 6g it is an equilibrium for L banks
to charge r0 (L), there are always equilibria in which banks make zero prots. We focus upon
the maximal equilibrium prots. Simple calculations yield maximal individual bank prots of
about 8  10 4, 10  10 4, 9  10 4, and 7  10 4 in the respective cases with 3, 4, 5, and 6
banks. The highest per-bank prot is obtained with 4 active banks. Joint prots are maximized
with 5 active banks.
7. Heterogeneous Monitoring Skills
In this section, we consider an extension of our model in which some banks are endowed with a
better monitoring technology than the others. Specically, we assume that these superior banks
have a monitoring technology q^a, q^b which satises the following assumptions:
q^a > qa;
q^b < qb.
Superior banks will thus reject less good (type b) rms and reject more bad (type a) rms
than inferior banks do. The adverse selection e¤ect is thus stronger in the presence of superior
competitors. On the other hand, the adverse selection e¤ect is less strong for superior banks
than it is for inferior banks. This is most easily seen in the extreme case that superior banks
have perfect monitoring technologies.
The existence and characterization of pure strategy equilibria will obviously depend on the
number of inferior and superior banks, on how much better the superior technology is, and on
the exact screening cost. In this Section we will assume that screening costs are given by (2)
so that both superior and inferior banks have capacity constraints. Let us assume that rms
know the quality of monitoring of each bank. When all the banks charge the same interest rate,
rms will apply to the bank where they have the highest probability of being granted a loan.
Hence, all type b rms will in rst instance apply to the superior banks, while type a rms will
exhaust the supply of inferior banks before applying to a superior bank. Hence, the inferior
banks su¤er from a cherry-picking externality(Morrison and White, 2004). If condition (ES)
holds, an active inferior bank will make losses whenever a superior bank charges the same or
16
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a lower interest rate. Hence, in a pure strategy equilibrium either no inferior bank is active or
two or more inferior banks charge the same low interest rate while one or more superior banks
charge a much higher interest rate.
We are able to show that equilibria of the rst type will certainly exist, provided that at
least two banks have the superior technology.6 Namely, applying the construction of Section 4
applied to a model in which all banks have the superior monitoring technology, one nds that
a number of superior banks coordinating on the same interest rate below r0(1) will constitute
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this adjusted model. Obviously, inferior banks can do no
better than remain inactive.
Theorem 2. Suppose that there are at least two banks with superior technology (q^a; q^b) with
q^a > qa and q^b < qb. Suppose furthermore that inequality (ES) holds when qa and qb are
replaced by q^a and q^b, respectively. Then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which only
superior banks are active, and all pure strategy equilibria are of this type.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of theorem 1. 2
This straightforward extension of theorem 1 is of interest for several reasons. First, the
equilibrium we are envisaging is one where the number of active banks is limited by the access
they have to the superior technology. Second, if the acquisition of the superior technology is
the result of learning by doing, then it fully justies Sha¤ers (1998) idea of a winners curse in
the market for credit.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we explore credit market equilibrium when banks perform costly screening. When
the screening technology is su¢ ciently accurate and su¢ ciently convex, we are able to prove
that pure strategy equilibria exist. This complements Broeckers (1990) result that there is no
pure strategy equilibrium when screening is costless. Moreover, equilibrium prices in our model
are the result of a coordination process. This implies the existence of positive equilibrium prots
as well as a disconnect between marginal cost and prices.
Apart from the convexity assumption, a crucial implicit assumption we make is that banks
cannot refuse applicants without screening. Given the convexity of screening costs banks have
incentives to ration applicants. They could potentially do this by falsely claiming that applicants
6The second type of equilibrium, in which inferior banks charge low interest rates and superior banks charge
high interest rates, may exist in very special cases. However, we were not able to nd parameters consistent with
the model and satisfying this condition.
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failed the test and therefore refuse credit. Our implicit assumption basically says that banks can
only refuse credit if they have some proof to back up their decision. A full analysis of the case
where banks can ration applicants is beyond the scope of this paper and is left to future research.
We also made quite some specic assumptions with regards to the parameters of the model,
some of which are stronger than those made by Broecker (1990). These stronger assumptions
were only made to focus on a particular type of pure strategy equilibria, namely those where all
active banks charge the same interest rate. They do not facilitate the existence of pure strategy
equilibria. For example, if the tests of di¤erent banks are imperfectly and positively correlated,
the adverse selection e¤ect would be reduced since clients rejected by competing banks would be
more likely to be rejected by one owns test. This would create the possibility of pure strategy
equilibria where one group of banks coordinates on a low interest rate and attracts good risk
rms while a second group of banks charges a higher interest rate and attracts, on average, high
risk rms.
Finally, a substantial literature has argued that welfare is enhanced by allowing banks to
extract rents from their lending relationships. The prior literature has typically argued that
this rent is required to satisfy a screening incentive compatibility constraint. We approach this
problem from an alternative perspective. Proposition 1 shows that an increase in the number
of banks may decrease welfare. The reason in our model is that a higher number of banks
raises the probability that a bad creditor will obtain a loan after visiting all of them. Our work
therefore provides a new argument to support the policy recommendation that entry to the
credit market should be restricted.
Appendix
We start by establishing and proving some supporting results.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: The number of type a rms that are screened precisely k times (k < L) is l(1 qa)qk 1a
(as they are assigned to category A the rst k  1 times, and then to category B). The number
of type a rms that are screened exactly L times is lqL 1a (they are assigned the rst L 1 times
to category A). So the expected number of screenings for type a rms equals
l(1  qa)
L 1X
k=1
kqk 1a + lLq
L 1
a = l
1  qLa
1  qa
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Similarly for type b rms the expected number of screenings equals
(1  l)(1  qb)
L 1X
k=1
kqk 1b + (1  l)LqL 1b = (1  l)
1  qLb
1  qb
Given the symmetry between banks, the expected number of screenings equals f(L).
Of all the applicants screened by a particular bank, only those who are assigned to categoryB
receive a loan. This means that each bank has l(1 qLa )=L clients of type a, and (1 l)(1 qLb )=L
clients of type b. 2
Using the notation of this lemma we can establish the following expression for the expected
prot U (r; x), dened in part one of denition 1:
U(r; L) = ha(L)(par   1) + hb(L)(pbr   1)  C(f(L))
=
l(1  qLa )
L
(par   1) + (1  l)(1  q
L
b )
L
(pbr   1)  C(f(L)).
The function r0 (L) dened in part 2 of denition 1 is the solution to U (r0; L) = 0:
r0(L) =
l(1  qLa ) + (1  l)(1  qLb ) + LC(f(L))
lpa(1  qLa ) + pb(1  l)(1  qLb )
.
We make the following denition:
Definition 2. In an equilibrium with L active banks, let V (; L) be the prot which a bank
earns if it deviates to an interest rate , while its L   1 competitors charge an interest rate
r < .
The deviating bank in this denition will screen the lqL 1a +(1  l)qL 1b rms which are not
awarded loans at the other banks. On average, it will give loans to lqL 1a (1  qa) rms of type
a, and (1   l)qL 1b (1   qb) rms of type b. Its prots will therefore be given by the following
expression:
V (; L) = lqL 1a (1  qa)(pa  1) + (1  l)qL 1b (1  qb)(pb  1)  C(lqL 1a + (1  l)qL 1b ):
When L 1 banks charge interest rate r, let 0 (L) be the lowest interest rate in excess of r at
which another bank could extend loans and break even. 0 (L) is the solution to V (0; L) = 0:
0(L) =
lqL 1a (1  qa) + (1  l)qL 1b (1  qb) + C(lqL 1a + (1  l)qL 1b )
lqL 1a (1  qa)pa + (1  l)qL 1b (1  qb)pb
.
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Proof of Lemma 2
It is su¢ cient to show that 0 (L) > X for all L  0. Clearly,
0(L) 
lqLa (1  qa) + (1  l)qLb (1  qb)
lqLa (1  qa)pa + (1  l)qLb (1  qb)pb
 lqa(1  qa) + (1  l)qb(1  qb)
lqa(1  qa)pa + (1  l)qb(1  qb)pb > X;
The rst inequality follows from C()  0 , the second inequality holds since
d
dL

lqLa (1  qa) + (1  l)qLb (1  qb)
lqLa (1  qa)pa + (1  l)qLb (1  qb)pb

=
lqLa q
L
b (ln qa   ln qb) (1  l) (1  qa) (1  qb) (pb   pa)
(lqLa (1  qa)pa + (1  l)qLb (1  qb)pb)2
> 0: (3)
so that lq
L
a (1 qa)+(1 l)qLb (1 qb)
lqLa (1 qa)pa+(1 l)qLb (1 qb)pb
is an increasing function of L, and the third follows directly
from (ES).
Proof of Lemma 3
The result follows from straightforward manipulations, using the expression for r0 (L).
Proof of Theorem 1
From lemma 2, condition (PS3) is satised provided U(r; L)  0. On the other hand, we know
from the nal condition in (A50) that r0(1) < X and that r0(1) > r0(2) (because of (C)).
Two cases are to be considered. Either (i) r0(1)  r0(2)  :::  r0(N) or (ii) there exists
L < N such that r0(L) < minfr0(1); r0(L + 1)g.
We consider rst case (i): it is clear that it is an equilibrium for all N banks to charge r0(1)
as (PS1) and (PS2) then hold, so does (PS3) and there is no inactive bank (L = N), so (PS4),
(PS5) and (PS6) are trivially satised. Note that since U(r; L) is linear in r, for any L > 1
with r0(L) < r0(1) there exists a unique real number L such that U(L; L) = U(L; 1). The
previous arguments apply to show that for any r 2 [r0(N);minfX; Ng], all N banks charging
r is an equilibrium.
Consider now case (ii). Let r 2 (r0(L);minfr0(1); r0(L + 1)g). It is obvious that the
situation in which L banks charge r constitutes a pure strategy equilibrium: by the choice of
r conditions (PS1), (PS4), and (PS5) are satised. As observed before, this implies that also
(PS2) is satised, and since r00(L) > X for all L by lemma 2, this implies that V (X;L+1) < 0
so that (PS6) is satised. Since r > r0(L), we have U(r; L) > 0 and (PS3) follows.
If in a pure strategy equilibrium two active banks charge di¤erent interest rates, the one
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who charges the higher interest rate makes negative prots because of lemma 2. Hence, active
banks must necessarily charge the same interest rates.
Proof of Lemma 4
The proof procedes in three stages as follows:
Stage 1. Under (A50), limL!1 LC(f(L)) = 0, and thus limL!1 r0(L) = 1= flpa + (1  l)pbg =
1=p
Proof: Set  = [ l1 qa +
1 l
1 qb ].
lim
L!1
LC(f(L)) = lim
x!0
1
x
C(f(
1
x
))
= lim
x!0
C(x[l

1 q1=xa
1 qa

+ (1  l)

1 q1=xb
1 qb

])
x
 lim
x!0
C(x)
x
= lim
x!0
C 0(x)
1
= 0
Since under (A50), C 0(0) = 0 and LC(f(L))  0 for all L, the result follows. 2
Stage 2. Under (A3) and (A50) there exists M such that r0(M)  r0(1) and r0(L) > r0(1) for
all L > M .
Proof: By assumption (A3), 1=p > X. Since r0(1) < X and limL!1 r0(L) > X, there exists
M such that r0(M)  r0(1) and r0(L) > r0(1) for all L > M . 2
Stage 3. When U (r; L) > U (r; 1) there cannot be an equilibrium with L banks. Hence M is
the maximum number of banks.
Proof: Now observe that @@rU(r; L) <
@
@rU(r; 1). It follows that when r0 (L) > r0 (1), we
have U (r; L) < U (r; 1) for any r  r0(L). 2
Proof of Proposition 1
There is no equilibrium in which just one bank enters. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium
in which L > 1 banks are active, and each charges rL, and that there also exists an equilibrium
with L+ 1 active banks, each of which charges rL+1. Equilibrium conditions (PS5) and (PS1)
imply that rL  r0(L + 1)  rL+1  X. The di¤erence in total welfare between the two
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equilibria is
W (L+ 1) W (L)
= l(paX   1)(qLa   qL+1a ) + (1  l)(pbX   1)(qLb   qL+1b )  (L+ 1)C(f(L+ 1)) + LC(f(L))
= V (X;L) + [C(lqLa + (1  l)qLb ) + LC(f(L))  (L+ 1)C(f(L+ 1))]: (4)
When screening costs are given by equation (2) and L > 1, the square bracketed term disappears.
Hence
W (L+ 1) W (L) = V (X;L)  0,
where the inequality follows from (PS6) in case rL < X: no inactive bank will enter and charge
X when L banks charge rL < X. In the case where r

L = X, then r0(L + 1) = r

L+1 = X,
which implies that W (L + 1) = 0, as banks would make zero prot and rms would enjoy no
surplus in the equilibrium with L + 1 active banks. Obviously, also in this case we have that
W (L+ 1) W (L)  0.
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